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fs the Soviet Union as much to blame as the United States for the nuclear arms race? Why are  
Soviet troops still fighting the war in 
Afghanistan with no solution in 
sight? Is the Soviet Union a force for 
progress in the Third World? These, 
and other questions are subjected to 
a sober analysis in Jonathan Steele's 
The Lim its o f Soviet Power, It is a 
book free from the alarmism of the 
"Soviet threat" propagandists, but 
also of the apologetics of those who 
see Soviet foreign policy as based on 
the principles of "peace and 
socialism",
Steele's conclusion, which is in 
sharp contrast to the commonly 
accepted thesis of a global Soviet 
"expansionism", is that Soviet 
influence has declined over the oast 
twenty years. Despite Soviet rhetoric 
to the effect that the "socialist world 
system" is becoming ever more 
powerful, Steele argues, the Soviet 
Union is, if anything, less influential 
as a political, ideological and 
economic model in the world today 
than in the early 1960s.
Brezhnev presided over a rapid 
buifd-up= of military power, but this 
did not correspond to a growing 
global influence of Soviet-style 
socialism . The Soviet leaders  
suffered a number of serious foreign 
policy setbacks during Brezhnev's 
eighteen-year reign. In particular, the
breakdown of "detente" in the late 
70s had very negative effects on the 
Soviet Union.
in the early '60s, the emergence of 
China as an independent power 
weakened Soviet strategic security as 
well as its credibility as the leadinq 
country of socialism. Though Sino- 
Soviet relations have improved since 
the early '80s, Steele agrees with 
most other writers on the subject that 
the Soviet Union will continue to plan 
for a "worst case" scenario in its 
dealing with China. The possibility of 
a two-front war will remain as a 
constant element of Soviet strategic 
planning.
Viet Mam, on the other hand — in 
the language of most Western 
observers — is a Soviet "gain". Steele 
shows, however, that the Vietnamese 
leadership, which has a long history 
of independence, today has far more 
autonomy vis-a-vis Moscow than the 
East European countries. From the 
Soviet point of view, there are 
political and military advantages in its 
close links with Viet Nam, but in 
economic terms, it Is an enormously 
costly friendship.
E vents in a number of countries in the '60s and '70s, discussed by Steele, show that the Soviet 
Union has had very limited success in 
its attempts to establish a lasting 
influence even in states which at one 
stage were close to Moscow. The 
military might of the Soviet Union has 
not been easily translated into 
political, economic or cultural and 
ideological influence. Though Soviet 
diplomatic and political support is 
acknowledged by many countries 
striving for independence from the 
West, and Moscow is a major
alternative supplier of arms, the 
Soviet form of socialism today has 
little attraction to Third World 
countries.
On the positive side, a number of 
countries of "socialist orientation" 
(Angola. Mozambique, Ethiopia, 
South Yemen, and others) emerged 
in the 1970s and have established 
close links with the Soviet Union, 
H ow ever, these nations are 
exceedingly poor, and have had little 
choice but to continue to depend on 
the capitalist world for most of their 
trade. The Soviet Union has not been 
able to provide large-scale economic 
assistance. Despite their highly 
p u b lic ised  ad h eren ce  to the 
"scientific socialism" of the Soviet 
variety, the countries of "socialist 
orientation" have not significantly 
contributed to an increase in Soviet 
prestige or in fluence in the 
developing countries generally. 
Soviet writers also acknowledge that 
most of their new Third World allies 
are in such deep crisis that their 
further advance towards socialism is 
by no means assured.
Cuba, Viet Nam and Mongolia 
belong to a different category. As full 
members of the CMEA (Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance), they 
are part of the "world socialist 
system". Contrary to the notion of 
"expansionism", It is important to 
note that the Soviet Union has not 
been keen to add to the membership 
of the CMEA. Most of the countries of 
" s o c ia lis t  o r ie n ta t io n "  have 
friendship treaties with Moscow, but 
have not been  o ffe re d  full 
membership of the CMEA. Angola 
and Mozambique, though considered 
by Soviet theoreticians as having 
a d v a n c e d  b eyo n d  "so c ia lis t  
orientation" towards the building of
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"people's democracy" and socialism, 
have not even been guaranteed 
security against South African 
aggression and have had to enter into 
humiliating agreements with their 
enemy.
The rise of Islam has further 
complicated Soviet policy in the 
areas adjacent to its southern border. 
The revolution in Iran resulted in the 
emergence of an anti-communist 
regime. In the Middle East, the Soviet 
Union has been largely excluded 
from exerting any influence on the 
Arab-lsraeli conflict. Soviet relations 
with Syria, Iraq and Libya, countries 
often portrayed in the Western media 
as closely aligned with Moscow, are 
strained and Soviet in fluence  
minimal. In the whole of this region, 
only South Yemen is a close ally of 
the Soviet Union.
Far from having pursued an expansionist and adventurous foreign policy, Steele argues 
that the Soviet leaders have generally 
been cautious and conservative. In 
cases such as Ethiopia and Angola,
where Soviet involvement has been 
portrayed by sections of the Western 
media as aggressive, the Soviet 
leaders had little to do with the 
original unfolding of events and only 
became involved following requests 
for assistance from internationally 
recognised regimes. The invasion of 
Afghanistan is an exception to this 
pattern but, in Steele's analysis, fits 
into the picture of a foreign policy 
based on the overriding objective of 
national security,
In Steele's view, there is no 
evidence for the existence of an 
expansionist dynamic to Soviet 
policy. Though striving for increased 
influence, this is something most 
major powers have in common, and 
Soviet initiatives are a priori no less 
legitimate than those of any other 
nation. There are examples of 
policies which seem to conform with 
the ideology of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, but there are also 
innumerable cases of unprincipled 
dealings with repressive regimes 
(Uganda, Turkey, Libya, and so on).
Steele's book covers many other 
aspects of Soviet policy as well as 
those referred to here. It is 
a thorough survey of Soviet policies 
in all major parts of the world. It's a 
readable book, devoid of abstract­
ions and academic language. The 
reader might object to its empirical, 
m a t t e r - o f - f a c t  a p p r o a c h  to 
international politics, which tends to 
underestimate those features of the 
Soviet system which set Soviet 
politics apart from those of other big 
powers. In particular, the importance 
of marxist-leninist ideology hardly 
figures at all in Steele's analysis. 
Nevertheless, The Limits o f Soviet 
Power complements Fred Halliday's 
more analytical The Coming o f the 
Second Cold War very well for an 
understanding of the global politics 
of the present time.
Hans Lofgren works in the Politics 
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/ n place of the moral and strategic vacuity of structuralism {not the only example of the retreat of 
socialist culture, but probably the 
most influential). Anderson proposes 
a new path for marxist discourse. He 
sees the possibility for a relevant, 
renewed marxism in a discourse 
which accommodates elements of 
both a restored marxist utopianism 
(a tradition extending from William 
Morris and Saint-Simon to Herbert 
Marcuse and E.P. Thompson) and 
practical social analysis (represented 
by Raymond Williams). A continuing 
dialectic between these two streams 
will yield a strategy of promise and 
"practical hopes" The result will be 
closer to the critical theory of the 
Frankfurt School of Habermas, 
Marcuse, et al . whose critique 
evolved primarily at the philosophical 
level, as such failing to describe the 
strategic processes Anderson calis 
for. A key element of Anderson's 
prescription for marxist renewal lies 
in the description of a feasible 
socialist model which is faithful to all 
hopes for the liberation of society 
from advanced capitalism, and hence 
is not confused with Russian or 
Chinese models. For Anderson, the 
economic considerations of the new 
society are paramount, and he refers 
to Alec Nove's Economics o f a 
Feasible Socialism  as a basis for 
developing a functional economic 
strategy
Anderson’s appeal seeks to unite 
the causes which cha l le nge  
advanced capitalism (the feminist 
and peace movements are crucial), 
under the common banner of the one 
hope for a new society: the path of 
historical materialism, it is a 
persuasive appeal to which those 
who feel the need for change should 
respond enthusiastically. It's a small 
book, but it may be that the program 
for fundamental social progress 
proposed by Anderson recaptures 
the brightest hope for our time.
James Koebne works at the Arts 
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the field of aesthetics and its radical 
potential.
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